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Abstract: This article argues that partition – a peacebuilding approach in a 
post-conflict society – can lead to the transformation of intrastate conflict to 
interstate conflict, thereby providing a helpful insight for further comparison of 
partition with multi-ethnic settlements such as federalism/powersharing and 
reconciliation. While advocates of partition maintain that intrastate conflict 
caused by a security dilemma between ethnic groups can be settled only by 
partition, this article argues that partition could cause the transformation of 
conflict rather than settling it. The cases of India-Pakistan and Cyprus provide 
the empirical evidence. The partition of India and Pakistan transformed 
intrastate conflict within India into interstate conflict between India and 
Pakistan including nuclear competition. The partition of Cyprus contributed to 
interstate conflict between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, this article 
concludes that the transformation of conflict reduces the value of partition, 
and that it is necessary to take this point into consideration when partition is 
compared with alternatives such as federalism/powersharing and 
reconciliation. 
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Introduction 
As a piece of the special issue, rather than discussing federalism/powersharing and 
reconciliation themselves, this article examines a counter-concept of them, or partition, 
thereby contributing to a further understanding of their implications. Partition is an 
antithetical idea to multi-ethnic peacebuilding approaches such as 
federalism/powersharing and reconciliation to a post-conflict state. While many authors 
have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each peacebuilding approach 
when methods of conflict settlement are considered, it does not seem that an 
agreement on which is the best has been reached. Since Chaim Kaufmann argued for 
partition as a policy for the settlement of intrastate ethnic conflict, there have been 
intense controversies. While this article does not deny that partition contributes to 
inhibiting violence within a state, it points out that partition could transform an intrastate 
conflict into an interstate one rather than settling it. While the literature on partition has 
noted this side effect of partition, there does not seem to be an in-depth study of it. 
Hence, rather than simply comparing partition with federalism/powersharing and 
reconciliation, this article demonstrates that partition sometimes results in several new 
security issues at the international level. For this purpose, it examines two cases of 
partition, India-Pakistan and Cyprus. Through this work, it provides insights which help 
further comparison of partition and multi-ethnic settlements. 
First, this article reviews the theory of partition. Second, it shows that the partition of 
India-Pakistan led to interstate conflict between them. Third, it explains that the 
partition of Cyprus contributed to preventing interstate conflict between Greece and 
Turkey from deescalating. Fourth, based on lessons from these case studies, it further 
discusses the side effect of partition and shows the flaws of arguments for partition. 
Fifth, it notes that the decision of which peacebuilding approach to implement should 
be decided on a case-by-case basis. Finally, it concludes that the transformation of 
conflict reduces the value of partition, and that it is necessary to take this point into 
consideration when partition is compared with alternatives such as 
federalism/powersharing and reconciliation. 
1. Reviewing the theory of partition 
The core argument for partition is that when intense ethnic conflict occurs, the 
separation of rival groups is the only solution and attempts to establish an intermingled 
community of these groups can lead to further violence (Downes 2006; Johnson 2008; 
Kaufmann 1996, 1999). The theory of partition is based on two argumentsregarding 
ethnic conflict. The first is that ‘in ethnic wars both hypernationalist mobilization rhetoric 
and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political 
appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard’ (Kaufmann 1996, 
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137). While constructivists point out that ethnic identities are not fixed, Johnson (2008, 
146) argues that ‘[a]dvocates of partition need not accept ethnicidentity as given’ 
because ethnic wars themselves construct ethnic identities in the process of war. 
The second argument is that ‘intermingled population settlement patterns create 
real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic “cleansing,” and prevent 
de-escalation unless the groups are separated’ (Kaufmann 1996, 137; for arguments 
on the security dilemma in ethnic conflict, see Posen 1993). Downes (2006, 51) 
describes distrust prevailing in ethnic conflict where each side fears that it would be in 
peril of ethnic cleansing if it disarmed based on a peace agreement that was not 
honoured by the other side. ‘Defensive vulnerabilities’ and ‘offensive opportunities’ 
(Kaufmann 1996, 139) in an ethnically intermingled settlement intensify security 
dilemmas, and violent conflict in such situations would be resolved only by the 
separation of the warring groups. Multi-ethnic settlements could not mitigate the 
security dilemmas and each ethnic group would be opposed to such solutions because 
of fear and hatred intensified by the conflict. 
Based on these two arguments, advocates of partition point out that: whereas 
‘restoring civil politics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the 
war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation,’ partition ‘reduces both 
incentives and opportunity for further combat and largely eliminates both reasons and 
chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians (Kaufmann 1996, 137; also see Mearsheimer 
& Van Evera, 1995). These arguments are a thorough critique of peacebuilding through 
federalism/powersharing and reconciliation. Proponents of partition clearly claim that 
multi-ethnic settlement approaches do not lead to peace in post-war societies because 
ethnic civil wars destroy prerequisites for such approaches, namely loyalties to a state 
rather than ethnic groups and inter-ethnic cooperation/compromise(Downes 2006, 52-
53; Kaufmann 1996, 155-157). 
When advocates of partitionattempt to prove that the theory of partition is valid, they 
refer to the cases of India-Pakistan and Cyprus as empirical evidence (Johnson 2008; 
Kaufmann 1999, 2007). These two cases seem to be consistent with the theory of 
partition. However, the next two sections of this article demonstrate that India-Pakistan 
and Cyprus transformed intrastate conflict to interstate conflict and resulted in security 
issues in international relations. 
2. The partition of India-Pakistan and their interstate conflict 
When India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, partition was conducted. India 
has two main ethnic groups; Hindus constitute the majority and Muslims the minority. 
They used to live together peacefully under British rule because the target of their 
antipathy was the British, not each other (Hagerty 1998, 64). However as 
independence became a reality, anxiety about Hindu majority rule emerged among 
Muslims and it drove them to demand a homeland for themselves, Pakistan, in 1940 
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(Hagerty 1998, 64-65). During the middle of the 1940s, the Hindu-Muslim violence 
became intense (Paul 2005, 7) and eventually the British separated and created both 
India and Pakistan as independent states (Hagerty 1998, 65; Paul 2005, 7). This 
partition led to population transfers which lead Kaufmann (1999, 237) to point out that 
‘[t]he 1947-51 population exchanges resolved Hindu-Muslim security dilemmas 
throughout most of India and Pakistan’. 
 Although Kumar (1997, 26) posits that partition did not create peace by 
demonstrating that ‘the riots that followed in 1947-1948 left more than a million people 
dead in six months and displaced upwards of 15 million’, Kaufmann (1999, 230) argues 
that ‘[t]his correlation … is spurious’ because this violence was caused not by the 
partition itself but by security dilemmas between the ethnic groups. Kaufmann points 
out: because security of all the ethnic groups was assured by British imperial power, 
the removal of British rule created the security dilemma between Muslims and Hindus 
and this security dilemma led to the partition and the subsequent population transfers 
and violence. 
 However the partition transformed intrastate conflict within India into interstate 
conflict between India and Pakistan. These two states have experienced several near-
war situations and crises, three major wars and even nuclear competition. In particular, 
Kashmir has been a main factor in the conflicts between the two states. Kaufmann 
(1999, 237) argues that the Kashmir conflict ‘occurred not because India was 
partitioned but because Kashmir, whose population was about two-thirds Muslims, was 
not’. This argument assumes that if Kashmir had been partitioned, there would not 
have been conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan. However, Hagerty (1998, 
67) explains that the matter of legitimacy on which each India and Pakistan are 
grounded made it difficult to realize the partition of Kashmir. The legitimacy of Pakistan 
is based on the premise that ‘the subcontinent’s Muslims [can] safeguard their political 
rights only through the formation of a separate country’. Therefore Pakistan cannot 
allow Kashmir –where Muslims are the majority– to stay in India because it means that 
the legitimacy of Pakistan would be denied. Meanwhile, Indian ideology is based on the 
‘successful incorporation of all minorities, including Muslims, into the Indian political 
order’. If Kashmir were handed over to Pakistan, it would repudiate this ideology 
because it would serve to indicate that Muslims in Kashmir want to be in Pakistan 
rather than in India and this would allow other ethnic groups throughout India to doubt 
its legitimacy. Therefore Hagerty points out that ‘Kashmir is a zero-sum test for each 
state’s legitimating ideology: one’s validity invalidates the other’. 
 It might be argued that even though interstate conflict between India and Pakistan 
occurred, the partition was meaningful because it eventually contributed to mitigating 
violent conflict between Hindus and Muslims within India. This argument is not without 
merit. Howeverin this case the cost of partition seems to be too high: the interstate 
conflict between India and Pakistan has led to three wars and the proliferation of 
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nuclear weapons in South Asia. There is no doubt that violent intrastate conflict is a 
serious issue but it could be argued that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is at least 
as serious as, or perhaps more serious than, ethnic civil war – not only because of fear 
of nuclear war between them but also because of the danger that nuclear weapons 
could inadvertently come into the possession of terrorist groups. Although nuclear 
deterrence theory would suggest that the probability of interstate nuclear war between 
India and Pakistan remains low (Hagerty 2009) and the international community has 
committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists; the damage 
caused by nuclear weapons would be catastrophic ifused. Furthermore, Bajpai (2009) 
argues that the presence of nuclear weapons enabled Pakistan to resort to sub-
conventional or unconventional wars such as insurgency and terrorist attacks in the 
recent Indian-Pakistani crises over Kashmir.1 Given these points, what is obvious is 
that partition caused several and arguably quite serious security issues at the 
international level. 
3. The partition of Cyprus and interstate conflict between Greece and Turkey 
Cyprus was partitioned into the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus in 1974.2 The escalation of the enosis movement3 of Greek Cypriots 
led to violent conflict between the majority Greek Cypriots and the minority Turkish 
Cypriots. When the ethnic conflict became intense in 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus and 
occupied the northern part of the island. Eventually, this resulted in a de facto partition. 
Although thousands of people had been killed by the time of the partition, since then 
casualties have been almost zero up to now. Kaufmann (2007) assesses historical 
counterfactuals or what would have happened if Cyprus had not been partitioned. 
According to Kaufmann (2007, 208-215), avoiding the partition would have led to 
further ethnic cleansing and a civil war. Therefore, Kaufmann (2007, 220-221) argues 
that the partition of Cyprus contributed to the settlement of violent conflict there. 
 Certainly, the partition appears to have resolved security dilemmas and settled 
violence in Cyprus, but it can be argued that it transformed intrastate conflict within 
Cyprus into interstate conflict over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Although 
Greece and Turkey were traditionally in conflictual relations, they enjoyed a relatively 
good relationship for a period after World War II because of shared communist threats 
(Krebs 1999, 358). However Krebsargues that the issue of Cyprus extinguished their 
                                                
1 Nuclear deterrence theorists also acknowledge this point. See Hagerty (2009, 109-110). 
2 However, the international community recognizes only the Republic of Cyprus and only 
Turkey approves the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
3 The enosis movement is the movement to pursue the unification of Greece and Cyprus. 
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two decade friendship.The partition made this issue an enduring factor in the Greek-
Turkish conflict.Kumar (1997, 29) shows that ‘[a] violent demonstration by Cypriots in 
August 1996 resulted in Greece and Turkey threatening war’ and points out that ‘[t]he 
costs of containment, therefore, include permanent vigilance on the part of NATO and 
the Atlantic allies’. On the other hand, Kaufmann(1999, 258, note 85) counter-argues 
that the case Kumar highlights was ‘no more than some moderately warm rhetoric by 
Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, plus Turkish protests about attacks on three 
consulates’. During 1997-1998 Greece and Turkey had a crisis over the deployment of 
missiles by Cyprus and exchanged threats of war, but this crisis deescalated because 
of mediation by the EU (Rumelili 2003, 236-237). 
 It seems that the situation has at no point been so serious that it could have lead to 
war, but it is also the case that the partition made the issue of Cyprus an enduring 
factor in the Greek-Turkish conflict. This article does not argue that the partition of 
Cyprus was meaningless; it acknowledges that it stopped violence. Rather it 
underscores that the partition contributed to preventing interstate conflict between 
Greece and Turkey from deescalating.4 The Greek-Turkish conflict has been managed 
due to mediations byNATO and the EU (Kalaizaki 2005; Rumelili 2003, 236), while 
Cyprus is still a bottleneck for improving Greek-Turkish relationships. 
4. Lessons from the case studies 
These case studies of India-Pakistan and Cyprus show the side effects of partition. 
They demonstrate the flaws of partition theory. First Kaufmann (1996, 151) argues that 
‘[t]hose considering humanitarian intervention to end ethnic civil wars should set as 
their goal lasting safety, rather than perfect peace’. However partition is not always 
effective at creating lasting safety either, given that it can transform intrastate conflict to 
interstate conflict and create new security problems at the international level, as the 
case studies above have shown. Partition seems to be a compromise rather than a 
solution. As Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl(2009, 118) note: ‘[a]t the limit, if ethnic 
diversity drives conflict,if all states are partitioned into ethnically homogeneous nation-
states, the riskof intrastate conflict should decline as the risk of interstate conflict goes 
up’. Advocates of partition argue that while partition changes intrastate conflict into 
interstate conflict, interstate conflict is easier to manage by mutual deterrence 
(Kaufmann 1996, 150) or diplomatic pressure (Johnson 2008, 151). However it does 
not mean that there is noprobability of interstate war. Actually, the interstate conflict 
between India and Pakistan eventually led to three wars and afear of nuclear war, and 
the mutual possession of nuclear weapons led to unconventional/sub-conventional 
                                                
4 Kaufmann (2007, 215) also admits that ‘non-life-threatening costs of partition include further 
poisoning of Greek–Turkish relations’. 
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wars such as terrorism rather than deterrence. While advocates of partition attribute 
this point to the imperfect partition over Kashmir, they do not seem to offer an answer 
about how to resolve the problem of conflictual legitimacy between India and Pakistan. 
Thus the theory of partition needs to be further developed in order to answer the 
question of how to overcome these challenges. 
Second, Kaufmann (1996, 159) argues that ‘lasting peace requires removal of the 
security dilemma’ and ‘[t]he most effective and in many cases the only way to do this is 
to separate the ethnic groups’. However as the case studies above show: partition can 
transform an intrastate conflict into an interstate conflict, which is quite problematic in 
terms of security dilemma theory. The idea of the security dilemma originates from the 
argument that anarchy or the absence of a political authority over sovereign states is a 
defining characteristic of international politics (Booth & Wheeler 2008, 2) and the 
anarchic situation in international politics leads to the security dilemma (21-78). While 
the argument of the security dilemma within states is derived from international politics 
(Posen 1993), an intrastate security dilemma could be mitigated with more feasibility 
than an interstate security dilemma. This is because effective institutions can be 
established in domestic politics which would drastically reduce tendencies towards 
anarchy within the state (Hartzell 1999). Though in international politics institutions 
such as the EU or NATO may play major roles to mitigate interstate security dilemmas, 
their capability still seems to be limited (Krebs1999; Rumelili 2003). Partitionis 
problematic in that it would lead to a new security issue which is caused by an 
interstate security dilemma and is more difficult to mitigate because of the anarchic 
nature of international politics. 
5. Case by case 
While advocates of partition maintain that multi-ethnic settlements run a greater risk of 
the resumption of ethnic war than partition (Johnson 2008; Downes 2006, 51), there 
are still controversies over this argument (Horowitz & Weisiger 2009; Sambanis & 
Schulhofer-Wohl 2009). Therefore it is not reasonable to eliminate peace-building 
approaches through federalism/powersharing and reconciliation as a solution to a post-
war state. Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) demonstrate that there are cases 
where war recurred after partition while there are also cases where war ended without 
partition, and partition will work only under limited conditions. In addition, some studies 
of peace-building show that a multi-ethnic conflict settlement is possible even after a 
serious violent conflict and therefore suggest the possibility of a successful 
federalism/powersharingand reconciliation peacebuilding approach. For example: in 
Bosnia, victims of ethnic cleansing in an area returned to their homeland after the war 
and it contributed to the marginalization of ethnic nationalists there (Belloni 2005). 
It is not simple to decide which peacebuilding approach is the best – the answer to 
this question seems to differ case-by-case so further empirical study will be needed. 
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What is important is not to simply choose either partition or a multi-ethnic settlement 
approach but to compare the cost, benefit and feasibility of each approach to each 
conflict. In this sense the transformation of conflict needs to be taken into consideration 
for this comparison. 
Conclusion 
Rather than discussing federalism/powersharing and reconciliation themselves,  this 
article has provided insights for further comparison of these multi-ethnic settlement 
approaches and partition in post-conflict societies by demonstrating that partition can 
transform an intrastate conflict into an interstate conflict. In the case of India-Pakistan 
the partition has led to interstate conflict including wars, nuclear competition and 
terrorism. In the case of Cyprus the partition created safety within Cyprus but made the 
issue of Cyprus an enduring factor in interstate conflict between Greece and Turkey 
(although the conflict has not yet lead to war). These side effects reduce the value of 
partition as a conflict settlement approach. 
The examination of these side effects has provided a means by which to consider 
which conflict settlement approach is appropriate in a given case. Kaufmann (1999, 
248) argues that ‘[w]e should not fail to separate populations in cases that have already 
produced large-scale violence and intense security dilemmas’, and advocates of 
partition point out that partition is effective at creating lasting safety. However as 
discussed above, partition needs to be considered not only at the intrastate level but 
also at the interstate and global level. It is important to compare the cost, benefit and 
feasibility of each approach to each conflict as federalism/powersharing and 
reconciliation can be alternatives to partition.Only by doing so can reliable conflict 
settlements and reconciliation be achieved. 
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